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Among modern states and developed economies the commitment of
French farmers to the principle of private property is legendary.
The Code Napoleon provided one of the strongest legal bases for the
protection of these private rights that exsists in any nation. The
overt dedication in France to the support of peasant-type family
farming has persisted into the industrialera longer than in any
comparably developed land. It is perhaps because of this persistence,
and not in spite of it, that France has also been the first country
in the western world to develop an explicitly defined legal basis for
the promotion of group farming. This is provided by Law No. 62-917
of 8 August 1962 relative to the formation of “GroupementsAgricoles
d’Exploitationen Commun“ or Agricultural Groups for Farming in
Common, hereafter abbreviated GAEC.A’
Efforts to promote group activities in agriculture are not new
in France, where they have had a long history. What was new in 1962,
in the French context, was the clear cut determinationto give these
efforts a distinctive foundation in law, with the intention of creating
a new structural form in agriculture. The direct roots of this deter-
mination trace from the d~sorganized condition in which French agriculture
*
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The text of the law, and subsequent implementingregulations have
been consolidated in Groupements a~ricoles d’exploitationen commun,
l~gislation, r>glementation,statuts-types,Journal Officiel de la
R6publique Fra~aise, No. 1288, Paris, 1966. All references to the
law and Its implementingregulationswill be to this source.2
emerged from the Second World War. Scattered and small scale efforts
at group farming and mutual assistance had emerged spontaneouslyin
the immediate post war years. The first attempt at systematic co-
ordination dates from 1948 with the establishmentof a coordinating
body which was the predecessor of the organization now known as the
Union des groupements pour l’exploitationagricole, abbreviated UGEA.
The preeminent goal of this union was to promote an agricultural
structure that would facilitate the enlargement and modernization of
farms and their full participation in a market economy while preserving
the social values of the family farm unit, the principle of private
property, and at the same time enable farmers to participate in the
rewards of communal activity. This approach derived much of its
original momentum from leaders of the movement within the Catholic
church in France that sought to develop a “social Catholicism” or an
economy for the service of man. A vigorous exponent of this point of
view was Rend Colson whose book Motorisation et Avenir Rural (Mechanization
2/ and the Rural Future)~ proposed that small and medium sized peasant
farmers group themselves together to enable the use of new machines.
This proposal was urgently advanced as an alternative to a feared
massive take-over of peasant-type farms by large scale commercial
mechanized units that m France were identifiedwith capitalistic agri-
culture, and were anathema to the Catholic left. This early effort
was directed as much to the task of persuading French farmers to
accept the tractor and its revolutionizingimplications for French
g
Paris, Centre National d’Etudes Rurales, 19S0.3
agriculture as it was to the task of devising a new form of organization
for Larm management.
‘1’l~ese etforLs were strongly supported by the Young Catholic Farmers
Association or Jeunesse agri.cole chr~ti.enne (JAC), guided by the conviction
that a “third road” was needed between what were regarded as the abuses
of capitalism and the excesses of Marxian collectivism. These convictions
played a major role In the transformationin 1956-57 of the former youth
group of the staid French syndicalist farmer’s association (FNSEA) Into
a reinvigoratedCentre National des jeunes Agriculteurs or National
Confederation of Young Farmers, abbreviatedCNJA. It was the polltical
strength of this group, strongly influenced by Cathollc social pollcy,
that led to agriculturalreform legislat~on focused on structural pollcy
In 1960 (the Lol d’Orlentatlon Agrlcole) and 1962 (the Loi Compl~mentalre),
~dentlfledwith the name of M. Pisani, the French Minister of Agriculture
under whose regime lt was developed. The legislationsupporting group
farming activity is a key part of that body of structural reform law.
Although enacted in August 1962 the law was not effective until adop-
tion of implementingdecrees (ddcrets d’applicatlon) by the Council of State
on 3 December 1964. After aix years of legislative drafting and nine months
of parllmentarydebate, a frameworkwas created for the formal recognition
of group farming. It IS significant that in the final debate on the law
the senators and deputies insisted that its application be restricted to
small and medium szzed peasant farms to Insure that it would not become a
vehicle for the subsequent creation of kolkhozes, or “production cooper-
atives” of the style that had emerged in eastern Europe following the4
S~’cond World War. Group farming was explic
an evolutionary step toward the proletarian
of French agriculture.
tly not designed to bc
zation or collectivization
In broad outlines, the purposp of the law creating the GAEC was
to make possible the common management of farms under conditions that
are as comparable as possible to those that prevail m conventional
family-type farms.
This group effort, it was hoped, would result in a reduced indi-
vidual labor input3 greater productivity, and improved security in both
economic and social terms, while retaining the incentive for individual
responsibilityand the sense of ownership of property and products that
had characterized peasant farms in the past.
To implement this purpose, the GAEC was created with the legal
status of a corporate body under private law, but of a special type
(socl&t{civile particulikre). Its most distinctive feature concerns
the manner of its creation and subsequent supervision by the state.
Before a GAEC can exist it must be approved by a Committee of Review
and Approval (comit& d’Agr;ment) to be created in each Department,
comprising the prefect and eight members (4 officials, 3 farmers, and
a Notary). These are responsible to a national committee in Paris,
comprising three representatives from the Ministry of Agriculture,
one each from the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of the Interior,
plus farmers and representativesof farm organizations. The national
committee acts as a pollcy making and appeals body, with primary respon-
sibility for implementationdelegated to the Department committees.5
A GAEC is largely exempt from the customary fees and charges
levied upon the creation of a conventional corporation,with the
exception of a single “RecognitionFee” of 50 francs.
Unless there are specific provisions to the contrary in the
GAEC agreement, the liability of an individualmember i.slimited
to twice the value of his original contribtuion of capital. In
practice, this limitation is frequentlymodified by the credit re-
quirements of the firm.
Tenants and leaseholderscan be members of a GAEC, regardless
of whether or not they turn over their leased land in whole or in
part to the GAEC. If the tenant elects to turn over his leased land
to the GAEC for cultivation in common, he retains his individual
liability to his landlord for performance of his rental contract
and need only notify the landlord by registered letter of the action
he has taken. The permission of the landlord is explicitly not
required.
In contrast, if the rental arrangement is a share-croppingagree-
ment (m&tayage),permission of the landlord must first be obtained.
Members of a GAEC must be primarily engaged in farming as an
occupation, and must be natural persons. Juridical persons or cor-
porations cannot be members. Spouses or minor children can be members
but cannot qualify for the several forms of public subsidy or financial
assistance available to GAEC members unless they have been active for
at least three years as independent farmers or GAEC members. A GAEC
cannot be formed by husband and wife only.6
A principle repeatedly stressed in the law authorizing the for-
mation or GAt?Cft is that membership shall in no way impair tht’rights
of an ~ndiviclual member to land, to tilt’ products of thl’land, or to
any entitlement he would have had as an independentfarmer to participate
in governmentalprograms of agricultural or social assistance. Under
French law, for example, the minimum term for the lease of farm land
is nine years. A tenant or leaseholderwho has held land under lease
for a minimum of five years has a right of preemptive purchase, in
case the landowner decides to selL the land. If the tenant pools
his leased land with other land, in the formation of a GAEC, he retains
this right of preemption.
If crops or livestock produced by a GAEC are commingled for marketing
or processing, the individualmembers retain a legal title to their
proportionateshare, As taxpayers, the obligation of members is indi-
vidual and personal and 1.snot assumed by the GAEC. In computing the
entitlement of a GAEC to any governmental subventionsor financial aids,
the sum is computed by adding together the individual entitlements of
the separate members. In the explicit language of Article 7 of the
basic law, participation in a GAEC cannot result in an economic, social
or fiscal status for a member or his family that is in any way inferior
to the status of other farmers or the families of farmers.
The law is equally explicit with regard to the obligation of each
member to participateactively in the work of the GAEC. There can be
no silent partners. Each member must be a working member, excepting
only the ill, the Infirm or the aged. Article 1 of the law emphasizes
that the purpose is to permit work in common “under conditions comparable
to those existing in family farms”. To this end, the article goes on7




family-type farm, and cannot include more than ten
precision in this limitation on areal size has never
been resolved. The size of a family farm is a relative concept, subject
to wide variations, geographicallyand over time. In approving GAEC
applications, the Departmental Commttees of Review and Approval in
practice have held to the maximum of ten members as the principal
limit on size, 3/ leaving open the question of maximum permissible area.-
Addltional evidence of legislative intent that the GAEC shall
approach as closely as possible to the structure and function of a
family farm is the specificationthat a GAEC can engage in the marketing
or processing of agricultural products but this activity cannot become
the principal function of the association.
The foundation capital (ap port au capital social) must be at least
10,000 francs, and cannot fall below this amount. It may be contributed
in money or in kind (land, livestock, buildings). A member can also
qualify by contributing only labor (app ort en industrie)although this
is relatively rare, or by contributing intangible rights (bi.ens mis b
disposition), for example, a leasehold. In practice, the foundation
capital has been contributed primarily m the form of money or live-
stock, or rented land, Owned land or
been contributed outright to the GAEC
buildings have typically not
but have been leased to it.
~1
H. Nallet, C. Roger, and M.C. Al Hamchari, Les GroupementsAgricoles
d’Exploitationen Commun(GAEC ), Tome 1: Les uaractbristiques
structurellesdes GAEC, Paris, Institut National de la Recherche
Agronomique, S&ie Travaux de Recherche, No. 7, Janvier 1971, p. 22.8
Thw law recognizes two types of GAEC, partial and total. The
partial GAEC are designed to permit the pooling of capital and labor
for a specific branch of farming activity, typically some form of
animal or poultry husbandry. These partial GAECS are very much in
the minority, and in practice the dominant form has been the full GAEC
or GAEC total. ——
It is important to stress the fact that a GAEC is not a cooperative.
It involves cooperation, in the fullest sense of the term, and the
evolution of the GAEC idea owes much to the historical strength of
the cooperative movement, in France and in other countries. But French
law regulating conventional agricultural cooperatives is relatively
rigid and confining, and was not considered flexible enough to provide
a basis for the goal of a “cooperativeof labor” that was predominant
in the minds of the originators of the GAEC approach.
Although possessingmany characteristicsof a corporate body, it
is equally important to stress the fact that a GAEC is not a corporation
In the usual sense of the term. The strongest evidence of this dis-
tinction is provided by the degree of supervisionby the state. Creation
of a GAEC involvesapproval by the Departmental Review and Approval
Committee (Comit&d’Agr&ment) of a charter specifying the following
details, among others:
1) The number of members and their contributionsand respon-
sibilities to the GAEC.
2) The amount and nature of contributed capital.
3) The liabilitiesor obligations that members bring with them
into the GAEC, or assume as members.9
4) Tlw method of payment for 1Rbor und rinyspvc!(I 1 nrranglwwntN
regarding the division of labor among members.
5) Provisions regarding the division of profit and loss.
6) Procedures to be followed in any transfer of members’
rights by inheritance.
7) Procedures to be followed in case the GAEC is dissolved.
No hard and fast rules are laid down in the GAEC law or implementing
decrees for the determination of rates of rennmeration for labor or
capital. In principle, locally customary rates are used. Any real
estate owned by members but leased to the GAEC is paid for at a
rental rate that is customary for that region. A l!nor~llt interest
is paid on contributed capital. Labor is paid at a wage rate that
is in principle to be adjusted annually in accordance with farm wage
rates in the community. The basic law of 8 August 1962 specifies
(Article 4) that the remuneration of members for their work in the
GAEC constitutes a charge sociale. This places the labor income of
GAEC members on a par with the wages of workers in a conventional
business corporation, in case of bankruptcy. The payments to
members for their laborarea prior claim upon the assets of the
group and cannot be appropriated by creditors.
In computing the payment for use of any buildings that are
not included in the foundation capital contributed by members but
that are used by the GAEC, the use value is taken aa the ba~is for
valuation rather than market price, The guiding rule is that work
shall determine rewards. The goal is to avoid any situation in
which relations among members begin to resemble those among employer
and employee, capitalist and worker, or stockholderand manager.10
Upon approval by the Departmental Comit~ d’Agre$ment, the GAEC
charter must be published in two newspaperswith a circulation in
the region, stating the date of activation of the group. The charter
becomes an item of public record, available to all, and a copy must
be maintained at the headquarters of the group, available to all
members.
Attempts had been made before 1962 to supplement existing French
cooperative law in order to encourage communal farming efforts. In
terms of its subsequent importance in the evolution of the GAEC idea,
the most widespread of these earlier efforts involved the common
ownership of farm machinery. With the support of Pierre Tanguy-Prigent,
Minister of Agriculture (1944-47) in de Gaulle’s first post-war cabinet,
peasant groups were created for the collective purchase and use of
farm equipment. These farm machinery cooperatives,or Coop&ratives
d’utilisationdu matdriel agricole (abbreviatedCUMA), had priority
in the purchase of scarce farm equipment in the immediate post-war
years. Gordon Wright has succinctly summarized this phase:
“CUMAS sprouted at once like mushrooms after a rain; by
1948, more than 12,000 of them had been organized. During
the next two or three years, however, many CUMAS disappeared,
and it became clear that the movement had been partly artificial
in character. While tractors were severly rationed and CUMAS
enjoyed a purchase priority, well-to-do farmers had organized
false CUMAS in order to get a machine without delay. The
facade fell away as soon as rationing ended. Some genuine
CUMAS did survive, however, in spite of the tensions they
often generated among the co-owners, and by thel,~d-1950’s,
their number began to mount steadily once more. -?
g
Gordon Wright, Rural Revolution in France, The Peasantry in the
Twentieth Century, Stanford University Press, 1964, pp. 110-111.11




can be brought to life by reference to several
One in question was organized in 1968 in the
two pairs of brothers, with the strong encourage-
ment of the local Catholic priest. The brothers had been working
together in various ways for over ten years. Their first comnunal
effort was in 1957, when they purchased a hay-baler with money
furnished by their parents. In 1962 they formed a CUMA (see above),
primarily because they could secure a price advantage in purchasing
equipment. Throughout the 1950’s a 10 percent discount or rebate
on the dealer price of farm machinery had been available to all
farmers, as a form of state subsidy. This was limited, however,
by a celling of 150,000 old francs, if the buyer was acting as an
individual. For a CUMA, there was no upper limit to the subsidy.
The experiencewith the mchine cooperative encouraged them to
consider a GAEC.
four members were
or a total of 276
When they completed the organization in 1968, the
farming 60, 69, 92 and 55 hectares, respectively,
hectares (682 acres). Of this, 73 hectares were
owned land, and 203 were rented. All four had some rented land,
but 59 of the 73 hectares of owned ldnd were held by one individual.
Among the four, they rented from 46 different landlords.
Coincidentwith the formation of the GAEC they bought an
additional 200 partly forested hectares, giving them a combined
Drawn from field studies in 1967, 1969, 1970, and 1972. I am
especially indebted to Denis Bergmann, Jacques Brossier, Andr6 Brun
and Michel Petit for encouragementand aid in arranging interviews
and interpretingresults.12
area of about 400 hectares (988 acres) of agriculturallyusable land.
The purchased land was essential to the creation of the GA13C,since
much of their 203 hectares of rented land was in pasture. In the
Charolais region, laws of the commune typically prohibit the plowing
of pasture land. Rental rates for grassland in this area are set
in terms of the average price of a given number of kilograms of meat
on the Paris market in the preceding year. In 1970, for example,
the range in rental rates for pasture land was from the monetary
equivalent of 40 to 100 kg, of meat-value per hectare, in the commune
In question. Assuming an average rental of 60 kg. of meat at a price
of 6.15 new francs per kg., the rent for pasture land was approximately
370 new francs or roughly $75.00 per hectare in the early 1970’s. In
contrast, rents for crop land are set conventionally in terms of the
value of a given number of quintals of the crop per hectare, and in
this region seldom exceeded 4 to 5 quintal per ha. At 1970 prices,
cropland rentals rarely exceeded 200 to 250 new francs or $40 to $50
per hectare. No landlordwould willingly permit pasture land to be
converted to crop land, because of these rent differentials.
The GAEC provided an escape from this limitation on the conversion
of pasture land to crop land. With financial assistance from the Cr~dit
Agricole to enable them to purchase additional land and by pooling
their rented and owned land in a GAEC, the
approximately two hundred hectares of crop
hundred hectares of pasture land.
brothers emerged with
land to balance their two13
It is also probable that an additional incentive for creation of
this GAEC was to escape statutory limitations on farm enlargement, One
of the first successes of the National Confederation of Young Farmers
(CNJA) had been enactment of a law in 1958 (the R&glementationdes Cumuls .—
d’Exploitations)that set minimum size limits on farm subdivision,and
maximum upper limits on farm enlargement. These upper and lower limits
vary by Departments and region, ranging from minima of 6 to 20 ha. and
averaging 10 ha., to maxima of 30 to 100 ha. with an average of 50 ha.~’
Although exceptionswere possible and enforcementwas not uniform, the
existence of these limlts had been a barrier to farm size expansion,
especially If financial help was desired
a GAEC was formed, it was much easier to
expansion. In practice, this has been a
establishmentof GAECS in some regions.
from the Crddit Agricole. If
secure approval of farm size
supporting argument for the
The prlnclpal crops on this GAEC are wheat, barley, and rape, in
about equal proportions of 60 to 65 ha. each. The division of labor
is by function. One man does all the accounting and operates the
combine; one does all the plowing and field cultivation. One does all
the seeding, and cares for a sheep herd of some 80 ewes. The fourth 1s
the cattle man, caring for a total of some 300 head, scattered among
about 50 pastures. Some pastures have no water supply, and water must
g
OECD, Structural Reform Measures in Agriculture, Paris, 1972, p. 140. —14
be hauled for the cattle, a very laborious task. They employed one
full-tim~l worker, paid 800 francs net pcr month, plus board, the IISC’
of a house owned by the GAEC, and payment by the GAEC of the employee’s
share of social security.
Each of the four families drew 700 francs per month as a provi-
sional salary in 1969, the first full year of operation. The total
distribution of profits at the end of the year averaged an additional
700 francs per month, for a total family labor income of about 17,000
francs for the year. Each member also received an income on contributed
capital, ranging from 2,200 to 4,800 francs. Total annual family
income thus ranged from roughly 19,200 to 21,800 francs or approxi-
mately $3,840 to $4,360 at then-current rates of exchange. This was
by no means a handsome income, but the members regarded it as satis-
factory in view of the heavy start-up costs of the new organization.
In effect, organizationof the GAEC enabled them to shift a part of
their labor from the intensive care of animals (cattle, sheep, some
dalrylng), for which the rates of return per man hour were low, tQ
field crops with associated heavier use of machinery, and higher rates
of return to labor. Capital intensity of the firm increased, labor
intensity declined, and returns per man-hour improved.15
A second GAEC case study involved an intensive dairy farm in
north cc>ntral France, organized by a father and his two sons. with
a relatively large dairy herd of over 50 cows, the motive here was
three-fold” to insure a labor supply for the milking task, to qualify
for a construction grant from the Ministry of Agriculture for a
new dairy barn, and to qualify for a highly subsidized loan at 4%
interest from the Cr~dit Agricole, to buy more land. Under rules
current in 1972, the Ministry of Agriculture would grant a subsidy
of up to 400 francs per head of dairy cows housed (“per stanchion”),
toward the constructionof a new barn. By contributingas much of
the construction labor as possible, the three GAEC members reckoned
that this subsidy would cover roughly one-fourth of the cash cost
of the barn. If organized as a GAEC, they stood a much better chance
of securing approval of a modernization subsidy of this magnitude.
An even more important subsidy was available in the form of a
long-term loan from the Crddit A~ricole, to buy land. Before organizing
the GAEC, the father was engaged In beef cattle production. With
the aid of the 4% loan which was only available to the family if it
organized a GAEC, he sold his beef herd of Charolais cattle, bought
a dairy herd, and also bought more land. In effect, the family now
has two farms, one that the father considers “his”, and one about
2 kilometers away that is in the name of the oldest son. Both the
father and the son retain title to the land in their respective
names, and “rent it out” to the GAEC.
In this case the GAEC had permitted an expansion in the scale
of the business, with more land and better buildings, and had created16
a financial basis for a shift from beef to dairying. There is a
touch of irony in this fact, since French agricultural policy for
th{Ipa~t ducudr has stressed the nred to rcducc milk output nnd
increase beef production. For the family involved in this GAEC,
the relative prices of milk and mea~ and the relative capacity of
beef production and dairy farming to absorb and reward three man-
years of labor input, led to a reverse shift from beef to milk.
Adding more land and shifting to dairy~ng offered the prospect
of keeping his scms “on the farm”. This was the real stimulus for
the formation of the GAEC, frcm the father’s point of view. For
the two sons, a very attractive feature of the GAEC was the prospect
of occasional vacations and some opportunities for a “day off” in
spite of the demanding labor requirements of a SO-COW dairy herd.
For the women in the three families, an overriding stimulus for
communal organizationof a dairy GAEC was the prospect that they
could be relievec[ of much of the heavy milking chore which had
traditionally fallen to them.
This GAEC involved no significant shift in land use, or intensity
of cultivation. The primary consequencewas more land and a better
barn, hence an increase in capital intensity,a stabilized labor
supply, and a reclivision of labor among the family members. For
the two sons in the group, the social value of having some help with
the milking and c]fnot being “chained to a dairy cow” was clearly
a most attractive feature.
The first GAECS were organized during the winter of 1964-65,
immediately following the issuance of implementingdecrees No. 64-119317
and 64-1194 of 3 Dec. 1964 (see note 1 above). Initial growth was slow,
with some 30 GAECS authorized in 1965. The number of approved GAEC total
increased to 340 in 1966 and additions ranged from approximately 300 to
450 in each year from 1966 through 1972, as shown in Table 1.
In addition to the 2753 full GAECS at the end of 1972, approval had
also been given for 239 partial GAECS, for a grand total of 2992 GAECS of
all types (Table 2). The proportion of partial GAECS has declined slowly
from 12 percent of all GAECS in 1967 to 8 percent in 1972, and 7 percent
at the end of 1973. Through 1972, approval had been denied in 260 cases,
and 144 GAECS had been dissolved. The rate of
increasing. The number of dissolved GAECS was
and 50 in 1970.
Summary data for 1973 show a continuation
attrition is small but
estimated at 12 in 1969,
of the growth trend, with
a total of 3,500 GAECS of all types as of 10 December 1973, These involved
approximately 9,100 members, and a total area of 316,000 hectares, or
7/
just under 1 percent of the area of agricultural land in France.-
The typical GAEC IS predominantlya family affair, as the data in
Table 2 make clear. In 1967, GAECS involving parents and children or
brothers and sisters were 58 percent of the total; by 1972 this had
increased to 68 percent (2039 out of a total of 2992). They are also
increasinglytwo-man farms. GAECS comprising two members only were 46
percent of the total in 1967 and 55 percent in 1972. In contrast, GAECS
with 5 or more members fell from 10 percent of the total in 1967 to 5.6
percent in 1972.
II
Placide Rambaud, Les Coop&rativesde Travail Agraire en France, Ecole
Pratique des Haut~Etudes VI,
— —— .—
Centre de Sociologic Rurale, Paris, 1974,
p. 16018
Tab]e 1: Growth in the Number of
%
EC Total —. .— .
~ Year of Authorizat&& —.
Date Annua1 Cumulative
Approval










Source: Through 1968, H. Nal)et, et al, op. cit.,
pp. 82-84; for 1969-72, provisional estimates by
The Union des Groupements pour l’Exploitation
Agricole (UGEA), Paris.19
One of the most interestingtrends revealed by the figures
in Table 2 relates to size in hectares. The average GAEC reached
lts peak Of 105 ha, in 1969, and dcclinod 13 porccnt to 91 ha. (255
acres) by December 1972. With GAECS involving only two persons in
55 percent of the cases, comprising family members in 68 percent of
the cases, and averaging 91 ha. in size, the “representativefirm”
among GAECS looks very much like a consolidation of two medium-
sized family farms. As we shall see,this impressionwill be borne
out in a number of significant details,
A second revealing trend concerns the Increase in the proportion
of GAEC land that is operated under lease. In 1967 leased land was
55 percent of the total area in GAECS; by 11172this had increased to
62 percent. Almost all of the leased or owr~edland is held in the
name of one of the members of the GAEC. In a detailed study of the
land tenure status of 950 GAECS as of 1 June 1968, Nallet et al+found
that land owned m the name of the GAEC was less than 4 percent of
the total area, and land rented in the name of the GAEC from non-
member landowner!; (instead of from one of its members) was qmly
[1/ about 2 percent of the total area operated--- The GAEC device has
been used to pool use-rights in land hut it has clearly not been
used to create an alternate holder of p2?Opr’L!?tary rights. The GAEC
is definitely the creature of its members, resembling in many ways
a personal (or two-person) holding company.
g
Nallet, et. al., op. cit., p. 42.20
Table 2, Trends in Growth clfGAECS in France, 1967-1972g’ — .—— ——
Characteristic Status As Of December
1967 1969 1970 1972
I. GAEC Numbers
Approved GAECS
Of which: GAEC total
GAEC partiel
No. of GAEC dissolved
No. of GAEC applications
rejected
II. GAEC Membership
Among parents and children
Among brothers and sisters
Among non-relatives
TWO members only
3 to 4 members
5 or more members
With no hired laborers
With 1-2 hired laborers
Over 2 hired laborers
Ill
111. GAEC Area-
Total area in GAEC farms (ha.)
Of which” owned land (ha.)
leased land (ha.)










































































Assembled from reports of the Ministry of Agriculture and the Union
des Groupements pour l’ExDloitationA~, Paris, by Erich =er,
=eigende Zahl aber abnehmende Betriebsgrdssender franztisischen
Gruppenlandwirtschaften”,Innere Kolonisation, Vol. XXII, No, 5,
May 1973, p. 130.
y
Includes both GAEC total and GAEC partiel.21
The regional distribution of GAECS is sharply differentiated.
As shown in Table 3 and Figure 1, Just under half (46 percent) of
all GAECS in 1970 were situated in five of the twenty-two regions.
These formed two aresof concentration,one comprising Champagne,
Bourgogne, and Rhone-Alpes,and the other Bretagne and the Pays
de la Loire. With the exception of hill-farming areas of Rhone-
Alpes and parts of Bretagne, these are all regions in which medium-
sized peasant type farms are quite common.
In contrast, the five regions with the fewest GAECS accounted
for only 8 percent of the total. These include the Paris region
and Provence Cote d’Azur in which large peasant-typeand commercial
farms prevail, and Languedoc and Alsace with disproportionately
large numbers of small farms,
These regional differences point up a major characteristicof




a preponderanceof farms of medium size. They are relatively
in areas in which the farm size structure is dominated by farms
are either very laige or very small.
This is in part a reflection of official policy. Supporters
of the GAEC legislation saw quite clearly that there would be little
value in encouraging farming in common by pooling farms that were
too small to provide a tolerable level of living for their numerous
members. One striking fact that is shown in Table 3 is tlmt in
the five regions with the heaviest concentration of GAECS the number
of members averaged under 2.5 per GAEC. In the five regions with
the lowest frequency, the number of members averaged 3,3
It is clear that growth has been greatest in areas where
three man GAECS prevail.
per GAEC.
two- andTable 3. Regional Distribution of GAEC in
France, as of 10 December 1970aT ——
Region Number % of Agr. Used Agr. Used Ave. No. Of
Total Land Per Land Per GAEC Members
GAEC~/ Member!?/ Per GAEC
No. % Ha. Ha. Ha.
Rh8ne-Alpes
Champagne


























































































































2,190 100.0 2.8 Total or Average 106 40.1
a/
Including 1980 full GAECS (90.5%) and 210 partial GAECS (9.5%).
y
As of 31 December 1969.
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, and UGEA, as consolidated in U. Otzen,
“Entwicklungenund Auswirkungen von Betriebsfusionen,Dargestellt am
Beispiel der franz~sischenGruppenlandwirtschaft”,Agrarwirtschaft,
Vol. 21, No. 10, October 1972, p. 348.23
Figure 1: Number of GAECS, Total and Partiel,
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Source: U. Otzen, op. cit., pp. 348-349.24
Two other characteristicsof areas in which the increase in
the number of GAECS has been greatest call for particular emphasis.
One is the close association between communal farming efforts of
9 all kinds (GAECS,CUMAS, Producer Groups and CETAS-’) and the execution
of governmentallysponsored programs of strip farm consolidation
(remembremcnt). The second is the strong influenceof newspapers
and journals that promote group farming. Rambaud grouped the
Departments in three classes, those in which communal farming activity
was strong, moderate, or weak, and compared them in terms of a series
of indicators,includlng gross farm revenue, the degree to which
consolidationof strip parcels had been carried out, security of
tenure, professionaleducation, extent of systematic farm book-
keeping activity, use of cooperativemarketing agencies, and sub-
scriptions to journals devoted to cooperativeand communal farming.
The strongest relationshipwas with strip farm consolidation.
In Departments in which communal farming activity was weak, only
10 percent of the farm land had been consolidated. In the “strong”




of the land. A similar but less pronounced differ-
found with regard to subscriptionsto farm cooperative
the weak Departments, 17 percent of the farmers sub-
scribed to one or more journals, in the strong Departments, over
25 percent. Rambaud stresses in this connection the pervasive
y
CETAS are centres d’~tude techniques agricole, or small groups
of farmers organized cooperativelyto promote extension-type
self-education,under the guidance of a technicallytrained
agriculturalist,25
influence exercised by the journals 01 the Catholic Action movement,
and especially the JAC or Jeunesse a~ricole chr;tienne. A study in
1956 showed that these journals reached 19.4 percent of all farm
households. In the Departments where communal farming activity is
strong today, the rate of penetration of the Catholic Action journals
was much above the national average, reaching 36 percent of all farms
in twelve Departments of France de I’Est. In contrast, in eight
Departments of the Mediterranean basin where group farming activity
today is very weak, the Catholic Action press reached only 7.3 per-
10/
cent of the farms in 1956.—
Although the average size of GAEC farms has declined since 1969-70,
they are still quite large by French standards. For all France, the
average farm size in 1972 was 20 hectares. The average for all GAECS
in 1972 was 91 hectares, and for the GAEC total, 99 hectares, or almost
five times the national average. The size distribution of GAEC farms
is also highly skewed. In 1969, ten percent of the number of GAEC
total had 40 percent of the total area; 20 percent accounted for two-
thirds of all land in GAECS. In terms of the value of foundation
capital (capital social) the concentration is also great, though less
sharply skewed, with 12 percent of the GAECS accounting for 40 percent




Placide Rambaud, op. cit., pp. 84-87.
11/ —
Nallet, et al, op. cit., pp. 40, 44.26
In terms of’intellectualcapital, the superior position of
the GAECS is also noteworthy. GAEC members are better educated
than the typical French farmer. In 27 percent of the GAECS all
of the members have had some form of professional education. In
an additional 37 percent, at least one of the members has had
professional schooling. As a result, just under two-thirds of
the GAECS have benefltted from access to formal professional
training in agriculture. For French farmers as a whole, only
12/
eight percent have had this advantage.—
If we review the major characteristicsof the GAECS that have
been established to date in France, we are impressedwith several
facts. Perhaps most important is the relatively large scale of
operation, given the strong role tl~atperpetuation of the traditional
French family farm played in the adoption c)fthe original authorizing
leg,lslatlon In 1962. We are impressed as well with the strong role
played by Ideology in the organization and distribution of GAECS,
They have been heavily influenced by the economic action programs
of the Catholic church, and can fairly be ~egarded as an embodiment
of Cathollc rural policy in France.
On the economic front they have unquestionablycreated a better
base for credit and, perhaps most significantly,have provided a
better platform for the procurement of various types of French govern-
mental subsidies available to agriculture. In this regard, they have
12/ —
Rambaud, op. cit., p. 29.27
reduced the total overhead cost of qualifying for various types of
agricultural subsidy payments. They can be regarded as a rural
institutionalresponse to the development of a “grants economy” in
French agriculture. The front-loadedcost of preparing requests
for grants and financial aids are a burden on any organizational
structure. These preparatory costs of qualifying for the distribution
of public funds fall especially heavily on individualsat the lower
end of the income scale, There are definite economies of size
associated with the creation of the CAECS. One of the most important
concerns the greater efficiency that is thus made possible in
Justifying requests for public subsidies, and satisfying public agenc~es
distributing the funds that expenditure qualificationshave been met.
In several important regions of France the CAECS have confronted
a dilemma in the internal organization of their activities. Shifts
in the domestic terms of trade among agricultural products in France
since the formation of the European Cormnon Market have tended to
favor grain producers (and sugar beet growers) at the expense of
producers of livestock products. The harmonization of internal
common market agricultural prices began formally for grains on
July 1, 1967 and thus coincides approximatelywith the beginning of
the development period for CAECS in France. The relative increase
m grain prices that followed full implementationof the common
agricultural policy of the European economic community had the effect
of maki~ grain farming more attractive than the conversion of crops
through livestock. The one exception concerns milk prices which
were kept high on social grounds because of the widespread distribution28
of dairy cows among small farms. The milk price became a proxy for
a welfare program for low income and small f]calefarmers. The resulting
periodic milk surpluses have dampened significantrises in the milk
prices, whereas the sharp rise in world grain prices following the
large purchases by the USSR in the summer of 1972 added a buoyancy
to grain prices that has been lacking in the livestock sector. As
a result, economic trends over the entire period in which GAECS have
developed in France have tended to favor field crops over livestock.
The development of specialized farms concentratingon grain production
can result in highly seasonal labor demands, and is successful only
if high levels of mechanization can be achieved. The care of livestock
has one overriding advantage in that it fills in the valleys between
peaks In seasonal labor demand. Livestock provide a wide range of
opportunitiesfor the investmentof family labor in economically rewarding
enterprises on the farm, at a more or less steady rate over time.
Returns per hour may be low, but the “securl_ty of employment” is high.
Livestock enterprises are thus ideally suited to the type of family
farms that the GAEC legislation seeks to support. And in fact, the
growth of GAECS ha8 been prominent in areas in which livestock play
an important part in the mixed enterprises that characterize the
medium sized family farms of the regions.
Economic trends have thus pointed to specialization in field
crop production as the most rewarding way to modernize French agri-
culture in the past ten years. Social considerationsand the need
for steady employment opportunitiespoint, in contrast, to farms
combining a mix of enterpriseswith heavy emphasis on livestock as2!3
most likely to succeed under conditions of
a major goal is to provide productivework
Kroup farming in which
opportunities for 011
members of the group. This dichotomy has plagued the GAEC movement
from the beginning. There have been, in fact, relatively few GAECS
in the prlnclpal cereal grain producing regl_ons of France. The
mjority of GAECS are focused on a few principal livestock products
or are engaged in a variety of enterprises h which animal conversion
of pasture and field crops plays an importantrole.
The picture that emerges is that of GAECS torn between two
conflicting goals: One is a desire to increase labor efficiency
and labor Income by mechanized field crop production. The other is
a complusion to include a high proportion of animal conversion
activities in the firm m order to provide stability of employment
and opportunity for the utilization of available labor,
Another dilermna concerns the structure of decision-makingwithin
the GAEC firm. Perhaps the most important goal in the minds of the
originators of the GAEC idea was the achievement of full equality
among all cooperatingmembers. We have noted the repeated emphasis
placed on this goal in the basic legislation. The ideologicalleaders
of the GAEC movement have stressed the fundamental importance of the
development of a communal work ethic, in which no member is dominant.
They have seen this as most likely to emerge in full GAECS that involve
non-relatives. Rambaud points out that 73 percent of all articles
published in Agriculture de Group, the journal of the Union des
Groupements pour l’~ploitation Agricole (UGEA) between 1960 and 1972
13/
concerned GAECS total, and non-related members.—
1? —
Rambaud, op. cit., p. 36.30
[n spite of this strong promotional effort, we have seen in Table 2
above that 68 percent of all GAECS in 1972 were among relatives. For
full GAE;CS,the percentagewas 75.
a parent, almost always the father.
faxnlly, as Mendras points out, “the
Approximately half of these involve
in the traditional French rural
sons of farmers have no independent
14/
social existence as long as their fathers are allve”.- Traditions
as deeply rooted as this have been slow to respond to social and
economic change. The family tie has been perhaps the most powerful
bond that has held GAECS together, yet it wtasa desire to break out
of this rigid mould that led to the revolt of the young farmers in
1958 and the political pressure that resulted (among other things)
in the GAEC legislation.
The question of communal decision making in GAECS involving only
brothers 1s in many cases even more difficult to resolve. When a
parent is involved, there is at least a traditional answer to the
question: Who is in command? When relatives but no parent are involved,
there is a strong tendency for the division of labor to be decided
along craft or enterprise lines, as we have seen in one of the case
studies above. The problem of communal decision making tends to be
resolved by the creation of several “one man mini-firms”, within
the GAEC framework. Over time, it is not clifficult to imagine that
this could lead to the kinds of problems that have beset craft unions
14/ —
Henri Mendras, The Vanishing Peasant, Innovation and Change in
French Agriculture, Cambridge, Massachusetts,MIT Press, 1970,
p. 213.31
and guilds in the past. A jurisdictionalproblem in
could emerge in the GAECS.
Looking to the future, there are two additional




of Inheritance. Since title to land and buildings is retained in
almost all cases by the mdlvidual members, difficult problems of
valuation and compensationwill arise if the children of present
members decide they do not want to farm. If they offer to sell out,
the remaining members of the GAEC may be unwilling to pay market
prices for the real estate. If a confessional price is paid, the
heirs of the former GAEC member can easily be persuaded that they
have been cheated out of a part of their inheritance. The question
of capital gainsseem certain to plague the GAECS with the passage
of time.
A related problem concerns part-time farming and off-farm
work. A total commitment to farming is fundamental to the GAEC
idea. This runs counter to one of the major trends of our time
In developed economies that combine strong industrialand agri-
cultural sectors. In the larger group farming experiments in
Israel, and increasinglyin Eastern Europe, a solution has been to
bring the ‘Ioff-farm work” to the farm, in the form of supplemental
non-farming enterprises. These have involved agricultural processing
plants, furnituremaking, small metal-working or plastic manufacturing
activities, or the organization of teams to perform constructionwork
under contract during periods of low seasonal labor demands on the
farm. This has been the communal farming solution to the desire for
increased income from non-farm work.32
‘1’llc CAl~Cs are too small to permit this solution. lt sc(’rns
predictable tlmt the GAECS will come under increasing strain with
the realization that the rule that every member must work can be
interpretedto mean that every member must work on the farm all
the time. A greater flexibilitywill be required than is apparently
provided by the existing GAEC framework.
In one dimension, GAEC members have been participatingactively
m “off-farm work”, through their leadership activities in farm
organizations. A certain pioneering spirit has been required in
order to establish a GAEC. The members are much better educated
than the average French farmer. They have been called an “agricultural
elite”, and the appellation seems deserved. In a sample study of
179 GAECS with 518 members, Nallet and associates found that 56 percent
of the members held at least one position in a farm organization
(syndicate,cooperative,CUMA, CETA, etc.). These were often leader-
ship roles, with 19 percent of the GAEC members sitting on governing
bodies, and 14 percent serving as President of their organization.
In 12 Departments of the west of France, a separate study showed
that GAEC members represented 0.3 percent of the number of farms but
held 7 percent of the leadership posts in the farm organizationsof
15/
the region.—
Some interestingparallels can be drawn between the GAECS in
France and the family-farmcorporations that have evolved since the
1950’s in the United States. In both cases, the resulting firms
15/ —
Nallet, et al, op. cit., Tome II, Novembre 1973, p. 38.33
resemble large family farms rather than the new forms of farm
business organizationthey seemed to promise. Both are relatively
new institutions,have yet to meet the test of a severe agricultural





terms, the financial results of the GAEC have not
those achieved on comparably large individual farms.
They exhibit a tendency toward over capitalizationand above-average
indebtednessfor farms of their size and type, but this is a general-
ization that can also be made about the larger family-type farms in
many countries.
In concluding the most
and associates observe that
thorough available study of GAECS, Nallet
the major advantage of the GAEC lies in
the social sphere, and particularly in the opportunitiesthey provide
for members to have a regular “day-off”, take vacations, and participate
more actively in the social, professic)nal and political life of their
16/ communities.— If they have not succeeded in creating a new work
ethic, if they have not achieved financial results superior to those
of individual family farms, these are still encouraging achievements.
16/ —
Nallet, et al, op. cit., Tome II, p. 86.34
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